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Why female board representation matters: The role of female directors in 
reducing male CEO overconfidence 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
We suggest a novel reason why there might be a need for female board representation. 
Female participation in the boardroom attenuates the CEO’s overconfident views about his 
firm’s prospects as we find that male CEOs at firms with female directors are less likely to hold 
deep-in-the-money options. Further, we argue that female board representation matters for 
industries where male CEO overconfidence is more prevalent. We find support for our 
argument as female directors are associated with less aggressive investment policies, better 
acquisition decisions, and improved financial performance for firms operating in industries 
with high overconfidence prevalence. We also identify a market failure around economic crises. 
Firms that do not have (sufficient) female board representation suffer a greater drop in 
performance as a result of the crisis than those that have female board representation.  
  
 
JEL classification: G30, G32, G34  
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1. Introduction 
A rapidly growing literature suggests that female directors have a significant impact as they 
are associated with fewer employee layoffs (Matsa and Miller, 2013), lower propensity to 
initiate acquisition bids as well as lower bid premiums (Levi et al., 2014), higher research and 
development (R&D) expenditures (Miller and Triana, 2009), better firm reputation (Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Heugens et al., 2004), increased ability to reflect stakeholder interests (Rindova, 
1999; Carter, 2006), improved stock price informativeness (Gul et al., 2011), more equity-
based pay for directors and higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). Still, gender differences in behavior (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a review) alone 
may not necessarily lead to female directors having an impact because they tend to be 
minorities in the boardroom (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This begs the question as to why 
female directors are so influential. We attempt to answer this question by studying whether 
female board representation affects the beliefs and behavior of the CEO, who typically has the 
greatest influence on corporate decision making. Specifically, we examine whether the option 
exercise behavior of the CEO, an indicator of the CEO’s degree of overconfidence, is affected 
by female board representation. 
The CEO’s option exercise behavior provides an ideal setting to answer our research 
question. First, stock options are an important component of executive compensation (Hall and 
Murphy, 2002). Therefore, the option exercise and its timing are important aspects of the CEOs’ 
management of their individual wealth. Second, CEOs’ personal portfolio decisions are 
indicative of their beliefs about future firm performance. Previous literature suggests that CEOs 
who voluntarily hold deep-in-the-money options are likely to be overconfident of their ability 
to keep their company’s stock price rising, which induces them to postpone option exercise in 
order to gain from the expected price increases (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011). Third, unlike corporate decisions made by the top 
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management team that likely reflect the team’s collective beliefs, option holding and exercise 
decisions made by the CEOs themselves are more likely to reveal their individual beliefs. 
Hence, CEOs’ option exercise behavior is an excellent laboratory to investigate the following 
question: Does female board representation help reduce managerial overconfidence?  
We focus on CEOs because overconfidence is likely to be more prevalent among CEOs 
(Goel and Thakor, 2008; Graham et al., 2013). They are also the principal decision-maker 
within the firm. Their biased beliefs due to overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011) are therefore likely to have a notable 
influence on firm decisions and performance. In turn, female directors may affect corporate 
outcomes through moderating the CEO’s biased beliefs.  
To test whether female directors reduce male CEO overconfidence, we follow Campbell 
et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) in calculating the moneyness of CEOs’ option 
portfolios (i.e., the extent to which the stock price exceeds the exercise price) for each year and 
use it to capture their levels of (over)confidence. Holding onto options that are already deep in 
the money is considered evidence of overconfidence about the company’s prospects, drawing 
upon the rationale proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005), Malmendier and Tate (2008), and 
Malmendier et al. (2011).  
We find a negative and significant effect of the representation of women on boards, as 
measured by the fraction of female directors, on the level of option moneyness for male CEOs. 
Interpreting option moneyness as a proxy for overconfidence suggests that male CEOs at firms 
with female directors are less likely to exhibit overconfidence. As expected, the effect of female 
representation is statistically insignificant for female CEOs, suggesting that the observed 
negative effect on male CEO option moneyness likely reflects differences in gender. 
Having established a negative effect of female board representation on the extent of the 
CEO’s overconfidence, we attempt to identify the circumstances under which this effect has 
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an impact on corporate decisions, and ultimately performance. It is evident from the literature 
that too much overconfidence is detrimental to the firm because it leads to overly optimistic 
views about investment opportunities, resulting in overinvestment, financial constraints, and 
bad acquisition decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Malmendier et al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 2015). Therefore, by reducing CEO overconfidence, 
female board representation may result in less aggressive investment policies and better 
acquisition decisions. If this were to be the case, this would make board gender composition 
particularly important in industries in which CEOs are more likely to develop overconfidence. 
The effects of female board representation on corporate decisions should then be stronger in 
these industries. We find evidence in support of this argument as female board representation 
is associated with less aggressive investment policies, better acquisition decisions, and 
ultimately improved firm performance in industries with high overconfidence prevalence. 
There is no such effect in industries with low overconfidence prevalence. 
Importantly, we examine whether female board representation explains the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in firm performance during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
Managerial overconfidence is likely associated with poor performance during the crisis because 
it may lead CEOs to pursue aggressive strategies that ex post make their firms more vulnerable 
to the crisis (Ho et al., 2016). If female directors are more likely to caution against an overly 
optimistic assessment of investment prospects during noncrisis years, then the subsequent 
financial crisis should represent less of a shock for CEOs with female directors on their boards 
than for those without. The results are consistent with this prediction. We find that greater 
female board representation is associated with a smaller reduction in CEO option moneyness 
during the crisis. This finding suggests that, being cautioned against overconfident views about 
the firm’s prospects during noncrisis years, CEOs of firms with female board representation 
appear to be less affected by and adjust their personal portfolios less substantially in response 
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to the crisis. We also find that female board representation reduces the negative impact of the 
crisis on firm performance, consistent with CEOs of firms with female board representation 
adopting less aggressive strategies that make their firms less vulnerable to the crisis. 
Our paper makes three major contributions to the extant literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature on board gender composition (see e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011; 
and Levi et al., 2014) by suggesting a novel channel whereby women affect firm decision 
making. We find that this channel is the moderating effect of women on potential male CEO 
overconfidence. Hence, we add to the debate over whether board gender diversity affects firm 
performance. The literature is as yet divided with Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), Liu et 
al. (2014), and Bennouri et al. (2018) documenting a positive effect, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) 
documenting a negative effect, and Farrell and Hersch (2005) finding an insignificant market 
reaction to the announcement of a female appointment to the board. Our results suggest that 
the firm’s industry matters as female board representation is particularly valuable in industries 
with high CEO overconfidence prevalence. 
Second, this paper adds to research on the types of firms that perform better during a 
financial crisis. Lins et al. (2017) show that firms with more social capital were perceived to 
be more trustworthy and received a greater value premium and stakeholder support during the 
2007-09 crisis. In this paper, we show that firms with female directors experience a less 
substantial drop in performance during the crisis. Specifically, our paper complements prior 
studies by showing that the moderating effect of female directors on male CEO overconfidence 
explains part of this cross-sectional heterogeneity in firm performance. 
Third, our paper also contributes to the literature on whether overconfidence is more 
likely in certain types of decision-making environment. For instance, field research suggests 
that individuals are more prone to overestimating outcomes to which they are highly committed 
(Weinstein, 1980) and when the feedback they receive is delayed or ambiguous (Nisbett and 
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Ross, 1980; Simon and Houghton, 2003). More recently, Kolasinski and Li (2013), and 
Banerjee et al. (2015) find that board monitoring improves decision making by overconfident 
CEOs. Our findings extend this line of inquiry by showing that male CEOs are less likely to 
exhibit overconfidence when there is a greater representation of women on their boards. 
Our paper has two important policy implications. First, it suggests that female board 
representation matters more in certain industries than others.  Industries where female board 
representation creates value via reducing male CEO overconfidence include pharmaceuticals, 
computer software, coal, and construction. Second, our findings suggest a market failure 
around periods of economic crisis. Firms that do not have (sufficient) female board 
representation suffer a greater drop in performance as a result of the 2007-2009 crisis than 
those that have female board representation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains why female 
directors may have an impact on firm decisions despite their relatively low representation on 
boards. Section 3 describes the sample, model specification, and measurement of variables. 
Section 4 discusses the main results and addresses identification issues. Section 5 examines 
whether the effect of female board representation on corporate decisions and firm performance 
varies across industries. Section 6 investigates whether firms with female directors perform 
better during the 2007-2009 crisis. Section 7 tests the robustness of our results. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Why are female directors so influential? 
As female directors typically are in a minority, why would they have a significant effect on 
firm decision making, and ultimately firm performance? Membership of an underrepresented 
group does not preclude one from influencing managerial decision-making processes 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). Bordalo et al. (2012) argue that the salience of part of the 
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environment attracts our attention and that the information from that part receives a 
disproportionally greater weight in decision making. They cite Kahneman (2011: 324) that “our 
mind has a useful capability to focus on whatever is odd, different and unusual”. More 
specifically, Hillman et al. (2002), from their survey of the extant literature, conclude that 
individuals that are visually salient tend to be perceived as being more influential. Hence, given 
the minority status of women on boards and the mounting pressure on companies to increase 
board diversity, female directors are likely perceived to be more salient. 
In turn, the extant literature suggests that women manifest behavioral and attitudinal 
differences compared to males. 1  Importantly, they tend to be less overconfident in their 
decision making than men (Bellucci et al., 2010; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi et al., 2014). 
Further, female directors tend to be less conformist and are more likely to exhibit activism and 
express their independent views than male directors because they do not belong to ‘old-boy’ 
networks (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Hence, a key benefit of having female directors on the 
board is the improved quality of board deliberations on complex issues by bringing in different 
and sometimes conflicting perspectives and enriching the information set available to the board 
(Chen et al., 2005; Miller and Triana, 2009; Gul et al., 2011). The presence of female directors 
on boards tends to lead to more competitive interactions so that decision-making processes are 
less likely to be characterized by acquiescence or rapid consensus (Chen et al., 2016). Therefore, 
a board with female directors more likely pushes the CEO to consider a wider range of 
alternatives as well as the full set of arguments in favor and against any given alternative. This 
likely results in a more thorough and realistic assessment of the decision problem and 
attenuates the CEO’s potentially biased beliefs (Paredes, 2005). Hence, we expect that male 
                                                          
1 Beck et al. (2018) provide evidence that not only gender differences but also gender interactions matter as they 
find that first-time borrowers assigned to loan officers of the opposite sex pay higher interest rates, receive smaller 
and shorter-maturity loans, and are less likely to return for a second loan. 
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CEOs at firms with female directors are more likely to be exposed to divergent thinking and, 
hence, less likely to focus on information confirming their individual judgment, to overestimate 
the firm’s prospects, and to hold options that are deep in the money. 
 
3. Data, methodology and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Data 
We utilize several databases to construct our sample. The data on CEO characteristics (e.g., 
age, tenure, and gender) and option compensation is from ExecuComp. We obtain additional 
data on CEO careers and education from BoardEx. The data on director characteristics is from 
IRRC/Riskmetrics. Further, accounting data is from Compustat and stock returns are from 
CRSP. Financial firms are excluded. The final sample consists of 1,629 firms with 11,437 firm-
year observations between 1998 and 2013. There are 11,113 firm-years with male CEOs and 
322 firm-years with female CEOs. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
To explore whether female board participation influences the CEO’s option holding and 
exercise behavior, we estimate the following baseline empirical model: 
CEO option moneyness i, t+1 =  +  Fraction of female directors i, t 
     +  Z i, t + Industry i + Year t +  i, t                     (1) 
where CEO option moneyness is the estimated moneyness of the CEO’s stock options, which 
is discussed in detail in the following subsection. The key independent variable of interest, 
Fraction of female directors, is the number of female directors divided by the total number of 
directors on the board. Z is a vector of firm, CEO and governance characteristics that potentially 
affect the CEO’s option holding and exercise decisions. Industry i represents industry-fixed 
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effects constructed using the Fama and French 49 industry specifications and Year t captures 
the year-fixed effects. 
 
3.2.1. Measuring the dependent variable 
The use of the option-based CEO confidence measure is motivated by extant literature linking 
CEO confidence with their stock option holding and exercise decisions. The rationale is that 
CEOs are highly exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their companies as their human capital is 
undiversified and they typically have a large part of their wealth tied to their firms. Therefore, 
risk averse, rational CEOs would exercise their stock options early to divest themselves of 
idiosyncratic risk (Hall and Murphy, 2002). Holding exercisable deep-in-the-money options 
suggests that CEOs overestimate the returns on their investment projects and postpone option 
exercise to tap into the expected future gains, suggesting overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005).  
The ExecuComp data used to construct the option-based measure is not as detailed as the 
proprietary data that Hall and Murphy (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005) uses. Thus, we 
use a modified version of the Malmendier and Tate (2005) overconfidence measure, following 
Campbell et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012). Specifically, we estimate the average CEO 
stock option moneyness for each year as follows. We first calculate the average realizable value 
per option by dividing the total realizable value of the exercisable options by the number of 
exercisable options. Next, we subtract the average realizable value from the fiscal year-end 
stock price to obtain the average exercise price of the options. The estimated moneyness of the 
options is then calculated as the stock price divided by the estimated average exercise price 
minus one.2 As we are interested in the CEO’s decisions to hold options that could have been 
                                                          
2 The option moneyness variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the potential impact of 
outliers. 
 
10 
 
exercised, we include only exercisable options held by the CEO. Further, we allow the 
continuous “CEO confidence” measure to vary over time as overconfidence may vary with past 
experience and performance (Hilary and Menzly, 2006) and, more importantly, because our 
paper attempts to examine, among others, whether male CEO overconfidence varies with 
female board representation. 
An alternative measure of CEO beliefs in the future, proposed by Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), builds on the perception of outsiders. This approach consists of counting articles in the 
financial press that refer to the CEO as “confident” relative to the number of articles that 
characterize the CEO as “cautious”. However, we do not use this measure in our study, because 
it is an indicator variable based on the CEO’s press portrayal, rather than the latter’s actions, 
and hence is noisier (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and fails to capture changes in the CEO’s 
behavior due to the influence of female directors.   
 
3.2.2. Control variables 
We include several firm, governance, and CEO characteristics that potentially affect CEO 
overconfidence as measured by their option holding and exercise behavior. We include firm 
size as talented CEOs tend to work for larger firms to allow their talent to have greater impact 
(Edmans and Gabaix, 2011), and because managing large, complex firms requires better 
managerial skills and expertise. Similarly, firms with more growth opportunities have greater 
scope for talented CEOs to add value and hence are more likely to appoint them (Edmans and 
Gabaix, 2011; Graham et al., 2013). We measure firm size as the logarithm of sales and growth 
opportunities by Tobin’s q. In turn, talented CEOs are more likely to exhibit overconfidence 
(Goel and Thakor, 2008). In addition, leverage increases the riskiness of equity-based 
compensation, and thereby may affect the CEO’s decision to hold options. Hilary and Menzly 
(2006) provide evidence that individuals who have experienced past successes are more likely 
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to display overconfidence. Thus, we use both market (Stock return) and operating (Return on 
assets) measures to proxy for the CEO’s prior performance. Controlling for stock returns also 
helps mitigate the concern that our option moneyness variable may simply be a manifestation 
of stock performance. To reduce the potential impact of outliers, the above accounting variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Banerjee et al. (2015) show that increased board monitoring after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) serves to restrain the excesses of overconfident CEOs and improve their decision 
making. We include three governance indicators suggested in prior studies to account for the 
restraining effect of governance on CEO overconfidence: the Bebchuk et al. (2009) E index; 
Board size, which is the number of directors on the board; and Board independence, which is 
the ratio of the number of independent directors to board size. All firm, governance and board 
characteristics are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. 
We incorporate several controls for CEO characteristics because of prior evidence that 
they are important in determining individual behavior and decision making (Goergen et al., 
2015; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). First, we include CEO age as age consists of a variety of 
factors that progressively shape an individual’s behavior. Agarwal et al. (2009) indicate that 
the sophistication of financial decisions varies with age. Second, CEO tenure is the number of 
years the CEO has been in office, and CEO Chairman is an indicator variable that equals one 
if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. Both controls account for possible 
entrenchment, which may exacerbate biased beliefs (Banerjee et al., 2015). Moreover, we 
include CEO ownership to avoid entangling the measurement of overconfidence with the 
potential ownership and incentive implications of stock option exercise. 
The final set of controls captures the CEO’s professional background, past experience, 
and education. Graduating from a prestigious university and obtaining an MBA degree may 
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reflect innate intelligence and the accumulation of human and social capital (Graham et al., 
2013), which could affect CEO behavior and beliefs. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provide some 
evidence that CEOs with MBAs behave more aggressively. Ivy League is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the CEO attended an Ivy League university, and zero otherwise, and MBA is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has a Master of Business Administration (MBA) 
degree, and zero otherwise. Similarly, Age first CEO role, defined as the age at which the CEO 
became CEO for the first time, is a relevant managerial characteristic as it indicates innate 
talent. In addition, Qualification is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has 
professional qualifications (e.g., Chartered Financial Analyst, Certified Public Accountant), 
and zero otherwise. Further, military service during early adulthood has been shown to have a 
lasting effect on veterans’ life-choices and decision making (Elder and Clipp, 1989). Therefore, 
we include an indicator variable, Military experience, set to one for CEOs with prior military 
service, and zero otherwise.  
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the distribution of female board presence and the average for the option-based 
overconfidence measure across years and industries. Panel A shows the number and percentage 
of firm-years with female directors as well as the number and percentage of firm-years with 
more than one female director, in addition to the average CEO option moneyness across years. 
Panel B shows the equivalent numbers across industries.  
Panel A suggests that, while the percentage of firms with female directors increases 
during the first half of the period of study, it is relatively stable at about 75% during 2006-2013. 
In contrast, the percentage of firms with more than one female director increases steadily, from 
23.8% in 1998 to 43.6% in 2013. Not surprisingly, the average CEO option moneyness 
plummets around the 2001-2002 dotcom bubble burst, and the 2007-2009 crisis given that 
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CEOs are less likely to be overly optimistic during recessions. To ensure that our findings are 
not simply due to a recession effect, in Section 7.3 we show that the results are robust to 
excluding the two recession periods. In addition, the 2007-2009 crisis provides an interesting 
setting to examine how firms with female directors perform during a crisis to shed. This 
analysis can be found in Section 6. 
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Panel B presents the statistics across the 11 Fama-French industries (the twelfth industry, 
the financial industry, is excluded). There are notable differences across industries in terms of 
female board presence. Specifically, the percentage of firm-years with female directors ranges 
from a low of 56.2% in Business Equipment to a high of 92.4% in Utilities. The percentage of 
firm-years with more than one female director also varies across industries, ranging from 20.2% 
for Energy to 57.4% for Non-Durables. Finally, the industry with the lowest average CEO 
option moneyness is Utilities (0.401). In untabulated results, we find that the average male 
CEO holds options that are 68.6% in the money, which is significantly higher (at the 1% level) 
than the average moneyness of 45% for female CEOs. This difference is consistent with prior 
evidence that male executives exhibit relative overconfidence in their option holding and 
exercise decisions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). 
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the firm-years with male CEOs upon which most 
of our empirical analysis is based. The average fraction of female directors in firms with a male 
CEO is 10.4%. The average firm has annual sales of 5619.7 million US dollars, leverage of 
22.5%, a stock return of 13.0%, a return on assets of 14.3%, and a Tobin’s q of 1.9. As to the 
governance and board characteristics, the fraction of independent directors is 72.6%, board size 
is approximately 9, and the E index has an average value of 2.6. These descriptive statistics are 
similar to those reported by previous studies (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
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------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Moving onto the CEO characteristics, average CEO age and tenure are 56 years and 8 
years, respectively. In addition, the average age at which a CEO becomes CEO for the first 
time is about 46 years. The mean and median of CEO ownership are 1.5% and 0.3%. Further, 
the CEO is the firm’s chair for 61.3% of all firm-year observations. The CEO holds 
professional qualifications for 8.4% and an MBA degree for 37.9% of all observations, 
respectively. Finally, the CEO has military experience for 6.6% of the firm-years and has 
attended an Ivy League university for 19.3% of the firm-years. 
The rest of the table presents a comparison of firm-year observations with female 
directors and those without. There are significant differences between the two groups. In a 
nutshell, firms with female directors are associated with lower CEO option moneyness, greater 
sales revenue, higher leverage, fewer growth opportunities, higher accounting performance, 
but lower stock returns. In terms of the governance and CEO characteristics, firms with female 
directors have a greater fraction of independent directors, a larger board, a higher entrenchment 
index, a higher incidence of CEO duality, and a CEO with a better educational background but 
less experience. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Baseline regressions 
Table 3 contains the regressions testing whether CEOs exhibit less overconfidence in their 
option holding and exercise behavior when there are women on the board. The base 
specifications in Panel A are ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions where the 
dependent variable is the CEO’s option moneyness. Regressions (1) to (3) are based on the 
firm-years with male CEOs, and vary as to the control variables included. We start the analysis 
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by regressing CEO option moneyness on the fraction of female directors as well as industry 
and year effects in regression (1). Regression (2) also includes the firm characteristics. In 
addition, regression (3) also controls for the governance and CEO characteristics.  
In all the above specifications, the coefficient on Fraction of female directors is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, the 
coefficient in regression (3) indicates that a 10-percentage-point increase in the fraction of 
female directors is associated with a 6.24 percentage-point decrease in the male CEO’s option 
moneyness. As the average male CEO option moneyness is 68.6%, this represents a 9.1% 
reduction relative to the mean level. We also reran the regressions in Table 3 by including the 
square of Fraction of female directors, allowing for a non-linear relation between the fraction 
of female directors and the dependent variable. We did not find any evidence of such a non-
linear relation. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
We also examine whether women on boards have any effect on the female CEO’s option 
moneyness using the sample of firm-years with female CEOs in regression (4). We find no 
such evidence. Hence, the finding that the negative effect observed for male CEOs is not 
observed for female CEOs suggests that the relation between female representation on the 
board and the male CEO option moneyness likely reflects differences in gender. This confirms 
our hypothesis that female directors influence the behavior of male CEOs by making the latter 
less overconfident about their firm’s prospects. In what follows, we focus on the male CEO 
sample. 
In Panel B, we estimate several other specifications for robustness. We first estimate a 
firm fixed effects regression (regression (1)) to address the potential joint determination 
problem whereby an unobserved time-invariant firm characteristic simultaneously determines 
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CEO option moneyness and Fraction of female directors. The firm fixed effects regressions 
take into account the effects of within-firm changes on CEO option moneyness. The results 
suggest that firm-specific unobservables cannot explain the relation between CEO option 
moneyness and Fraction of female directors. We verify the robustness of our results using a 
Fama-and-MacBeth regression (regression (2)) with Newey-West standard errors.  
At the CEO-firm level, we find somewhat mixed evidence. First, the coefficient on the 
female director variable remains negative, but becomes statistically insignificant, when we 
estimate a CEO-firm fixed effects specification (regression (3)). One possible explanation is 
that using more granular fixed effects significantly reduces the within variation available for 
estimation. In support of this view, we observe significantly lower within CEO-firm variation 
than within firm variation. The number of changes in female board representation decreases 
from 2.383 in the average firm to 1.183 in the average CEO-firm, i.e. a 50.4% reduction. The 
lack of within CEO-firm variation would then work against finding a significant effect of 
female board representation on CEO overconfidence in CEO-firm fixed effects regressions 
(Zhou, 2001). We therefore restrict our sample to CEO-firm pairs with more than one change 
in female board representation to have a similar level of within variation to that of the firm 
fixed effects specifications. We then repeat the main analysis using the CEO-firm fixed effects 
regression on this restricted sample and find a negative and statistically significant effect of 
female board representation on CEO overconfidence (regression (4)). While adding confidence 
to the validity of our findings, we recognize that these results should be interpreted with caution 
because the sample restriction approach might have introduced selection bias that we are not 
able to eliminate in our setting. Third, we will show further evidence at the CEO-firm level in 
Section 4.2.3 by examining changes in CEO option moneyness around director appointments 
under the same CEO.  
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Regressions (5) and (6) are two different logit models whose dependent variable is an 
indicator variable set to one if the CEO has estimated option moneyness greater than 100% and 
67%, respectively, and zero otherwise. These binary measures identify CEOs with relatively 
high optimism. The two cutoffs of 100% and 67% are suggested by Campbell et al. (2011), 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), and Malmendier and Tate (2008). In all the above specifications, 
the coefficient on Fraction of female directors is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, confirming the negative effect of female board representation on the male CEO’s option 
moneyness.  
 
4.2. Identification 
While the results so far are robust and consistent with the hypothesis, the observed relation 
between Fraction of female directors and CEO option moneyness could be spurious due to the 
endogenous nature of board composition (Wintoki et al., 2012). For instance, there could be 
some unobserved firm and CEO characteristics affecting both the selection of female directors 
and the CEO’s option exercise decisions. Alternatively, overconfident and powerful CEOs may 
have influence over the board selection process and in turn board gender composition.  
To address these concerns, we employ three approaches. We first conduct propensity 
score matching whereby firm-years with female directors are matched with those without, 
based on observable characteristics. We also employ an instrumental variable approach to 
adjust for the potential endogeneity of board composition. Finally, we employ a difference-in-
differences (DID) matching estimator that exploits changes in female board representation 
resulting from female director appointments to identify whether women on the board affect the 
male CEO’s behavior. Overall, the tests confirm our baseline results and show that the data is 
inconsistent with several particular concerns. While these observations are reassuring, we are 
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careful to recognize that our analyses do not allow us to completely rule out alternative 
explanations in general.  
 
4.2.1. Propensity score matching estimates 
To identify a control sample of firm-year observations without female directors that exhibit no 
significant differences in observable characteristics compared to those with female directors, 
we first estimate the probability that a firm hires female directors using a logit model, i.e., 
regression (1) of Panel A in Table 4, which includes the same controls as regression (3) of 
Panel A in Table 3. This specification captures a significant amount of variation in the presence 
of female directors, as indicated by a pseudo R2 of 29.4% and a p-value from the χ2 test (not 
tabulated) of the overall fit of the model well below 0.001. The results suggest that firms with 
female directors are larger and have larger and more independent boards, consistent with 
Adams and Ferreira (2009).  
We then construct a treatment group and a control group of observations using the 
nearest-neighbor method based on the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, from 
regression (1) of Panel A. Specifically, each firm-year with female directors (the treatment 
group) is matched with the firm-year without female directors (the control group) with the 
closest propensity score. If a firm-year in the control group is matched with more than one 
firm-year in the treatment group, we retain only the pair for which the difference in propensity 
scores is the smallest. To ensure that observations in the treatment and control groups are 
sufficiently indistinguishable, we further require that the maximum difference (i.e., the caliper) 
between the propensity score of each firm-year with female directors and that of its matched 
peer does not exceed 0.01 in absolute value. We obtain 2,250 unique pairs of matched 
observations.   
 
19 
 
We conduct two diagnostic tests to verify that observations in the treatment and control 
groups are truly indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics. The first test consists 
of re-estimating the logit model (not tabulated) underlying the propensity score using the 
matched sample (see regression (2) of Panel A). All of the coefficient estimates are statistically 
insignificant, indicating that there are no distinguishable trends between the two groups. 
Further, the pseudo R2 drops substantially from 29.4% in the pre-match model to only 0.3% in 
the post-match model. The χ2 test also fails to reject the null hypothesis that all coefficient 
estimates equal zero. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The second test consists of examining the difference in means for each observable 
characteristic between the treatment and matched control groups. The results, reported in Panel 
B of Table 4, show that none of the differences is statistically significant. Overall, the 
diagnostic test results suggest that the propensity score matching removes observable 
differences other than the difference in board gender composition. Thus, it increases the 
likelihood that any difference in CEO option moneyness between the two groups is due to the 
presence of female directors on the board. Finally, Panel C of Table 4 reports the propensity 
score matching estimates. The results suggest that, if a director is female, the male CEO’s 
option moneyness decreases by 8.1 percentage points on average, which amounts to an 11.8% 
reduction relative to the mean level. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Thus, potential 
matching between female directors and firms/CEOs does not drive our findings to the extent 
that the omitted factors are observable.  
In untabulated tests, we examine the robustness of the results to alternative matching 
criteria and we confirm that our findings are essentially unchanged when we conduct the 
nearest-neighbor matching based on propensity scores (i) within the same Fama-French 49 
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industry and year; (ii) within the same Fama-French 49 industry, year, and MBA category; and 
(iii) within the same Fama-French 49 industry, year, and Ivy League category. Finally, we re-
estimate the baseline models using the matched samples. The results are qualitatively similar. 
 
4.2.2. Instrumental variable estimates 
To jointly address our concerns of potential unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality, 
we use the instrumental variables approach to extract the exogenous component of female 
board representation. The latter is then used to explain the male CEO’s option moneyness. As 
sources of exogenous variation, we use two instrumental variables that capture a firm’s 
likelihood of appointing female directors, one at the firm level and the other at the state level. 
Both are uncorrelated with CEO option moneyness, except through variables we control for.  
The first instrument is the fraction of a firm’s male directors who sit on other boards with 
at least one female director, which has also been used by Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Levi 
et al. (2014). The rationale behind this instrument is that the more connected a firm’s male 
directors are to women, the more female directors should be observed and appointed (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, we expect this instrumental variable to be positively correlated 
with the fraction of female directors. The second instrument is the female-to-male population 
ratio calculated as the female population divided by the male population in the state where the 
firm is headquartered. Firms in states where the female-to-male population ratio is higher are 
more likely to find qualified female candidates for their board of directors, ceteris paribus, 
given the potentially broader talent pools. Therefore, we expect that, the greater the female-to-
male population ratio, the greater the representation of women on boards will be. Meanwhile, 
it is reasonable to argue that a state’s female-to-male population ratio is not directly correlated 
with CEO option moneyness. 
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The first column of Table 5 (regression (1)) contains the results of the first-stage 
regression where the dependent variable is the fraction of female directors. Consistent with our 
prediction, the coefficient estimates for the two instruments are positive and significant at the 
1% level. We conduct three additional tests to verify that our instruments are not weak. First, 
we test the joint significance of the two instruments and find that the value of the F-test is 
relatively large (9.120) and highly significant (p-value=0.000). Second, the p-value of the 
Cragg-Donald’s Wald F weak-instrument test statistic is close to zero, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are weak (Cragg and Donald, 1993; Stock and Yogo, 2005).3 
Third, the p-value for Hansen’s J over-identification test is large (0.170), suggesting that the 
two instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term (Hansen, 1982). 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The second column (regression (2)) contains the second-stage regression results where 
the dependent variable is the male CEO’s option moneyness. The main variable of interest is 
the predicted value of the fraction of female directors. The coefficient on Fraction of female 
directors is negative and significant at the 1% level. Male CEOs at firms with lower fractions 
of female directors tend to hold options that are deeper in the money, after endogeneity is taken 
care of, confirming the causal relationship between female board representation and less 
overconfidence in the male CEO’s option exercise decisions. 
A potential concern is that the Fraction male linked to female instrument might capture 
the connectedness of the board and bias the results. To address this concern, we follow Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) in controlling for more direct measures of board connectedness 
                                                          
3 The Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value with one endogenous regressor and two instrumental variables based 
on 2SLS size is 19.93. For all the regressions, the Cragg Donald Wald F-statistic is much larger than 19.93. 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. 
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(regressions (3) to (6)): the total number of external board seats held by directors and male 
directors, respectively. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. 
 
4.2.3. Changes in CEO option moneyness around director appointments 
We also employ an identification strategy of difference-in-differences (DID) around female 
director appointments, which do not coincide with a CEO change, to identify the effect of 
women on boards. The DID analysis compares the outcomes for two similar groups with and 
without the treatment but that would otherwise be subject to similar influence from the trending 
variables. Therefore, if any trends in outcomes for the two groups prior to treatment are the 
same (i.e., the parallel trends assumption), then the impact of the treatment should be reflected 
in the difference between the changes for the two groups (Roberts and Whited, 2013).  
This analysis is based on the firm-years one year before and one year after a director 
appointment. To be included in the treatment group, the firm must appoint only one female 
director to replace a departing male director in the year of the appointment and the departing 
male director must be older than 60 to ensure that director turnover is more likely due to 
retirement than to corporate strategic changes or bad director performance. As stated above, to 
eliminate the possible confounding effects of CEO changes we exclude firms that experience 
CEO turnover during the period. Applying these criteria results in 60 female director 
appointments for the treatment group. For the control group, we identify 174 observations 
where a departing male director aged above 60 is replaced with one newly appointed male 
director.  
We then match treatment and control observations using propensity score matching to 
help satisfy the parallel trends assumption and ensure that the results are not driven by 
differences in CEO, firm and/or industry characteristics. The matching procedure is analogous 
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to that described in section 4.2. We end up with 56 unique pairs of matched firms. Based on 
this matched sample, we estimate the following regression. 
CEO option moneyness i,t+1 =  + 1 Female appointment i,t+1 + 2 Post i,t+1 + 3 Female 
appointment i,t+1 × Post i,t+1 +  Z i, t + Industry i + Year t +  i, t     (2) 
where Post is an indicator variable stating whether the year is after the director appointment. 
Female appointment is an indicator variable stating whether the firm is in the treatment group.  
The results are reported in the first column (regression (1)) of Table 6, which includes 
the same firm, governance and CEO controls as in regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. The 
coefficient on Female appointment × Post is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating 
that, after female director appointments, male CEOs are less likely to exhibit overconfidence 
in their personal portfolio decisions than after male director appointments. The estimated effect 
is also economically meaningful. On average, male CEOs tend to hold options that are 28.2 
percentage points lower in the money (or 41.1% lower relative to the mean level) for the year 
after the female director appointment than they do after the male director appointment. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
If it is harder for women to get on the board than it is for men, then the potential selection 
and resulting quality differences between female and male directors could alter the 
interpretation of the results. For example, it could be the case that those females that break 
through the glass ceiling are much better than their male counterparts. We take two steps to 
mitigate the concern that our findings are driven by differences in director quality and not 
gender. First, in regression (2) we include controls to capture several observable dimensions of 
director quality: Dummy_MBA replaces non-MBA (Dummy_Non-MBA replaces MBA) is an 
indicator variable stating whether the departing director without (with) an MBA degree is 
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replaced with a new director with (without) an MBA degree; Dummy_Non-Ivy replaces Ivy 
(Dummy_Ivy replaces non-Ivy) is an indicator variable stating whether the departing director 
who attended (did not attend) an Ivy-League university is replaced with a new director who did 
not (did); Dummy_Qualif. replaces non-Qualif. (Dummy_Non-Qualif. replaces Qualif.) is an 
indicator variable stating whether a departing director without (with) professional 
qualifications is replaced with a new director with (without) professional qualifications. The 
results show that controlling for the education and qualification variables does not have a large 
impact on the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction term. Second, in regression (3) 
we use director-pair fixed effects (i.e., fixed effects for each pair of departing male director and 
his replacement new director) to eliminate the impact of any unobserved time-invariant director 
characteristics on CEO option moneyness. The coefficient on the interaction term remains 
negative and significant at the 5% level. Thus, we conclude that the effect of female board 
representation on CEO overconfidence is not due to selection. 
To rule out alternative explanations pertaining to reverse causality, we examine the 
dynamics of the female board representation effect in regressions (4) and (5). The sample for 
this additional analysis includes the firm-years up to two years before and up to two years after 
a director appointment. Specifically, we create dummy variables indicating the first year and 
second year before the appointment (Post -1 and Post -2), the first year after the appointment 
(Post +1), and two years after the appointment (Post +2), and replace Female appointment × 
Post with the four interaction terms between Female appointment and these dummies. If our 
results are affected by reverse causation, the likelihood of appointing a female director might 
already be correlated with CEO option moneyness before the appointment, and thus we should 
observe a negative and significant coefficient on Female appointment × Post -2 and/or Female 
appointment × Post -1. However, the results indicate that, in both the OLS and director-pair 
fixed-effects specifications, it is only after the appointment that the negative effect on CEO 
 
25 
 
option moneyness becomes large and significant. Hence, the estimated female board 
representation effect does not reflect reverse causation or pre-existing trends. 
 
4.3. Female board representation and CEO overconfidence: Additional evidence from 
exercised options 
The CEO option moneyness variable used in the above analyses measures the average 
moneyness of all exercisable options held by the CEO, which could vary (i) when the CEO 
exercises some existing options, and (ii) when new packages of options become vested and 
exercisable. The former source of variation captures differences in the CEO’s exercise behavior. 
The latter, however, is less likely to reflect CEO behavior and beliefs since the CEO has little 
control over it. As an alternative, we isolate the observations relating to option exercises and 
examine the relation between the characteristics of exercised options and female board 
representation. For each option exercise in the sample, we study the following two 
characteristics: Value ratio, i.e. the ratio of the intrinsic value to the strike price of the option, 
where the intrinsic value is calculated as the stock price at exercise minus the strike price; and 
Time to expiration, i.e. the remaining number of years until the option expiration at exercise. 
This data is then aggregated for each CEO on an annual basis, using a simple average for the 
number of options exercised. The option exercise data is from the Thomson Reuters Insider 
Filings database. Sen and Tumarkin (2015) show that optimistic CEOs exercise options closer 
to expiration and at higher stock prices than non-optimistic CEOs. Untabulated results suggest 
that female board representation is associated with less optimistic option exercise choices 
characterized by more time remaining until expiration and lower value ratios at exercise.  
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5. Does female board representation matter across all industries? 
Extant research shows that too much managerial overconfidence is detrimental to the firm 
because it leads CEOs to form overly optimistic views about investment opportunities, 
resulting in overinvestment, a heightened sensitivity of investment to cash flows, and 
suboptimal acquisition decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Malmendier et al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 2015). Hence, it is possible that female board 
representation, by mitigating the CEO’s optimistic bias, reduces overinvestment and the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flows, as well as improving acquisition decisions, and 
ultimately firm performance. Then it follows that board gender composition may be 
particularly important in industries where CEOs are more likely to develop overconfidence and 
the moderating effects of female board representation on corporate investment decisions should 
be more prominent in these industries. 
The propensity of CEOs to hold biased beliefs may vary across industries, as differences 
in industry-wide practices (e.g., work attitudes, motivation techniques, and managerial 
practices) and growth prospects may significantly influence individual behavior (Rasmussen 
and Rauner, 1996). Further, field studies imply that overconfidence is more likely to occur in 
industries where the decision-making environment is non-repetitive and ambiguous, resulting 
in lack of prior similar actions to help calibrate judgment (Simon and Houghton, 2003). 
Consistent with these conjectures, we find that the dispersion of overconfidence among CEOs 
varies considerably across industries during the sample period and that the industries with the 
highest average CEO option moneyness are pharmaceuticals, computer software, coal, and 
construction.  
To capture the cross-industry differences in the prevalence of overconfidence, we 
construct a variable named High industry OC (overconfidence) representation. It is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the fraction of overconfident CEOs for an industry in that year is 
 
27 
 
greater than the sample median across all industries, and zero otherwise, with overconfident 
CEOs being those who hold stock options that are more than 67% in the money. We find 
evidence that the effects of female board representation on corporate investment decisions are 
more prominent in industries with a high prevalence of overconfident beliefs. 
In what follows, we investigate whether this differential effect of female board 
representation across industries remains when we focus on specific corporate decisions. Table 
7 presents the regression results where the dependent variable is capital expenditures scaled by 
beginning-of-year net property, plant and equipment. For each specification, we estimate the 
regression using two alternative econometric techniques: OLS and firm fixed effects. First, for 
regressions (1) to (3) based on the whole sample, the coefficient on Fraction of female directors 
is insignificant, but the coefficient on the interaction of the former with the industry 
overconfidence prevalence variable is negative and significant at the 10% level or better. This 
suggests that female board representation reduces investment in industries with high 
overconfidence prevalence. There is no such effect in industries with low overconfidence 
prevalence. In a similar vein, in unreported tables we find that female board representation also 
helps moderate assets growth (measured by the growth in total assets and growth in property, 
plant and equipment) in industries with high overconfidence prevalence, but not in those with 
low overconfidence prevalence. 
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that managerial overconfidence is associated with a 
heightened sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flows, i.e., overconfident CEOs 
overinvest when the firm has abundant internal funds, but investment is curtailed when the firm 
requires external financing. By moderating managerial overconfidence, female board 
representation is likely to reduce the investment sensitivity to cash flows.  
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To test our conjecture, we include Cash flow and its interaction with Fraction of female 
directors in regressions (4) to (9). The first three regressions are based on the subsample with 
above median industry OC representation and the latter three regressions are based on the 
subsample with below median industry OC representation. As per our expectations, we find 
that the coefficient on the interaction is negative and statistically significant only in the high 
industry overconfidence prevalence subsample.  
Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue that CEOs with overly optimistic beliefs tend to 
overestimate their ability to generate returns, overpay for target firms, and make value-
destroying acquisitions. Thus, we expect female board representation to have a positive effect 
on shareholder gains from acquisitions by attenuating managerial overconfidence about 
acquisition activities, especially in industries with high overconfidence prevalence. This is 
tested in Table 8.4 We start by estimating an OLS model (regression (1)) where the dependent 
variable is the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from five days before the 
acquisition announcement to five days after. The coefficient on Fraction of female directors is 
insignificant, whereas the coefficient on the interaction is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, suggesting that female board representation makes a positive contribution to cumulative 
abnormal returns in industries with high overconfidence prevalence, but not in those with low 
overconfidence prevalence.  
                                                          
4 The acquisition sample starts with all acquisition announcements listed in the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
database, which we then merge with accounting data, stock return and CEO characteristics data. Following 
previous studies (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Netter et al., 2011), we impose the following restrictions on 
our sample: (i) the deal status is “completed”; (ii) the acquirer is a US publicly listed firm, and the target is a US 
public or private firm, and neither is in the financial services industries; (iii) the acquiring firm obtains at least 50% 
of the target shares; (iv) the percentage of stocks held by the acquiring firm six months prior to the announcement 
must be below 50%; (v) deal value is greater than 5% of the acquirer value; (vi) the deal type is “disclosed and 
undisclosed (deal value) deals”; and (vii) the deal announcement occurs between 1998 and 2013. 
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Regression (2) is the second-step regression from the Heckman two-step method to 
address the potential self-selection bias in deal-initiation decisions. The first step involves 
estimating a selection equation for the deal-initiation decision. Following Masulis and Simsir 
(2015), we use Prior industry merger intensity as the identifying instrument in the first-step 
equation. It is calculated as the total number of merger deals in the industry (based on the Fama-
French 49-industry classification) within the past two years divided by the total number of 
mergers across all industries over the same period. On the one hand, CEO deal initiation 
decisions are likely to be positively related to the frequency of prior deals in their industry. On 
the other hand, there is no clear economic rationale for Prior industry merger intensity to affect 
the outcome variable directly. In the second step, we estimate the same model as regression (1) 
of Table 6, augmented by the estimated inverse Mills ratio from the first step. Our results are 
robust to this alternative approach. 
Finally, we examine whether the above moderating effects of female board representation 
contribute to firm performance and value. Table 9 shows that female board representation 
influences neither firm value, measured by Tobin’s q, nor firm performance, measured by the 
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), in low overconfidence-prevalence 
industries, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on Fraction of female directors. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term between Fraction of female directors and High 
industry OC representation is positive and significant (with one exception), suggesting that 
female board representation helps alleviate investment distortions associated with managerial 
overconfidence and improve firm value and performance, especially in industries with high 
overconfidence prevalence. 
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6. Female board representation and corporate performance during the 2007-2009 crisis  
The recent crisis has been described as the worst crisis over the past decades. Ho et al. (2016) 
find a link between managerial overconfidence and poor performance during the crisis. They 
argue that overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the probability of a positive state, 
underestimate the downside risk of a project, and pursue aggressive strategies that ex post make 
their firms more vulnerable during a crisis. Thus, if female directors are more likely to caution 
against an overly optimistic assessment of investment prospects during an economic upswing, 
then (i) the subsequent crisis should represent less of a shock to CEOs with female directors 
on their boards; and (ii) firms with female directors should experience less of a reduction in 
operating and stock performance. 
Mian and Sufi (2014) show that regions that suffered larger drops in house prices were 
more severely affected by the crisis, resulting in a larger reduction in consumption and 
employment. Accordingly, we exploit state differences in the house price collapse to capture 
the cross-sectional variation in the severity of the crisis. We then investigate whether female 
board representation attenuates the effect of the crisis on the change in the variable of interest. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression:  
∆y i, s =  + 1 Fraction of female directors i, s+ 2 1st Qtile House price shock s  
       + 3 1st Qtile House price shock s × Fraction of female directors i, s  
+ 4 4th Qtile House price shock s + 5 4th Qtile House price shock s  
× Fraction of female directors i, s +  Z i, s + Industry i, s +  i, s     (3) 
where index i refers to the firm and index s refers to the state where the firm has its headquarters. 
∆y is the change from 2007 to 2009 in the variable of interest, including CEO option moneyness, 
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Tobin’s q, ROA, and ROE. We classify House price shock into quartiles to allow for the 
potential nonlinear type of relation between the severity of the house price collapse and the 
variables of interest. 1st Qtile House price shock and 4th Qtile House price shock are indicator 
variables for the first (least severe) quartile and the fourth (most severe) quartile of House price 
shock, where House price shock is the percentage drop in the Zillow Home Value Index 
(ZHVI)5 from December 2006 to December 2009 in the state of the company’s headquarters. 
Fraction of female directors is defined as previously. As in previous regressions, we control 
for the same firm, governance, and CEO characteristics, all measured in 2006. Our timings are 
consistent with recent studies of the recession (Mian and Sufi, 2014). 
Several important observations can be made about Table 10. First, for the house price 
shock quartiles, only the coefficient on the 4th quartile tends to be significant, suggesting that 
the relation is asymmetric. Second, in regression (1) where the dependent variable is the change 
in CEO option moneyness, the coefficient on the interaction term 4th Qtile House price shock 
× Fraction of female directors is positive and significant at the 5% level, weakening the 
negative impact of 4th Qtile House price shock on the CEO’s option moneyness. Being 
cautioned against overconfident views about the firm’s prospects in the noncrisis years, CEOs 
of firms with female board representation appear to be less shocked by and adjust their personal 
portfolios less substantially in response to the subsequent crisis. Third, in regressions (2) to (4) 
where the dependent variable is the change in firm performance/value, again the coefficient on 
the interaction term 4th Qtile House price shock × Fraction of female directors is generally 
positive and significant, offsetting the negative baseline effect of 4th Qtile House price shock. 
                                                          
5 The house value index data is obtained from Zillow (http://www.zillow.com/research/data/). Zillow provides 
estimates of the price of more than 110 million individual houses in the US. These house-level valuations are then 
aggregated into the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI). We find that, on average, the ZHVI dropped by 10.5% 
from December 2006 to December 2009. 
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To sum up, all the above findings suggest that CEOs with gender-diverse boards adopt less 
aggressive strategies that make their firms less vulnerable to the crisis. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. Further discussion and robustness tests 
One possible concern is that the option-based measure may capture the CEO’s willingness to 
take risk (Kamiya et al., 2019), suggesting an alternative explanation whereby male CEOs 
become less risk tolerant rather than less overconfident in the presence of female directors. A 
key distinction between an overconfidence story and a risk tolerance story is in regard to how 
the option-based measure affects investment-cash flow sensitivity. The overconfidence 
hypothesis predicts a positive effect of the option-based measure on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). This is because overconfident CEOs tend to 
overinvest when they have abundant internal funds as they overestimate the returns from their 
investment projects. When firms require external financing, however, they curtail investment 
because they view external funds as unduly costly. On the other hand, if holding deep-in-the-
money options reflects higher risk tolerance, high option moneyness should be associated with 
lower investment-cash flow sensitivity since less risk-averse managers should be more willing 
to leverage up the firm, if necessary, to finance investment projects (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). We find a positive relation between the option-based measure 
and investment-cash flow sensitivity in our sample, which is contrary to the risk tolerance 
interpretation. This finding is consistent with that of Malmendier and Tate (2005). 
To further rule out alternative explanations related to risk taking, we re-estimate the effect 
of female board representation on CEO option moneyness after including additional controls. 
Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s weekly stock return over the past 
year. Ln(1 + Delta) is the natural logarithm of one plus CEO delta, where delta is defined as 
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the change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 1% increase in the firm’s stock price. 
Ln(1 + Vega) is the natural logarithm of one plus CEO vega, where vega is defined as the 
change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard 
deviation of the firm’s stock return.6 The results are robust to controlling for these variables, 
suggesting that differences in managerial risk taking cannot explain our findings.  
Another possible concern is that the results are driven by a few very vocal female 
directors, given the smaller pool of female directors compared to that of male directors. To 
address this concern, we repeat the baseline analysis after excluding firm-years corresponding 
to at least one female director having more than three, four, five, and six directorships, 
respectively. Still, we find that the coefficient on the female director variable remains positive 
and statistically significant in all specifications.  
Further, we examine whether the negative effect of female board representation on CEO 
overconfidence becomes stronger with the number of female directors and/or their roles on the 
board. Not surprisingly, we find that the negative effect is more prominent when there is more 
than one female director on the board and when at least one female director sits on board 
committees or serves as the CFO. These results, along with other results in the paper, appear 
to suggest that the increased presence of women on boards is more than window dressing. 
Finally, we take additional steps to ensure the robustness of our main findings. We 
confirm that our main findings continue to hold when (i) two alternative measures of 
overconfidence including Net buyer and Share retainer are used;7 (ii) firm-years with CEO 
                                                          
6 The data on managerial compensation incentives is from Coles et al. (2006) and can be obtained at http: 
//sites.temple.edu/lnaveen/data/. 
7 We construct two alternative measures of overconfidence based on the CEO’s stock transactions: (i) Net buyer 
is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is a net buyer of company stock in that year, and zero otherwise; 
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turnover are excluded to eliminate potential, confounding effects; (iii) the two crisis periods, 
the 2001-2002 dotcom bubble burst and the 2007-2009 crisis, are excluded; (iv) alternative 
clustering and alternative industry classifications are used (i.e., clustering by year, industry, or 
double clustering by firm and year, two-digit SIC industry dummies, three-digit NAICS 
industry dummies, or industry-year dummies). 
 
8. Conclusion 
We find that male CEOs at firms with female directors are less likely to hold options deep in 
the money, suggesting that female board representation moderates the CEO’s overly optimistic 
beliefs about the firm’s growth prospects. Further, we find that female board representation 
matters more in some industries than in others. More specifically, female board representation 
is associated with lower investment, reduced investment sensitivity to cash flows, less 
aggressive assets growth, better acquisition decisions, and ultimately improved firm 
performance in industries with high overconfidence prevalence, but not in those with low 
overconfidence prevalence, consistent with the view that female board representation affects 
firm outcomes through reducing the optimistic bias of male CEOs. Finally, we show that 
female board representation explains part of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in firm 
performance during the 2007-2009 crisis. The results suggest that firms with female directors 
experience a smaller drop in operating and stock performance during the crisis. All these 
findings highlight the importance of female board representation and provide evidence of 
female directors mitigating the CEO’s overconfidence. 
A meaningful extension to the paper involves identifying the channel(s) whereby female 
directors manage to reduce male CEO overconfidence when making corporate decisions. One 
                                                          
and (ii) Share retainer is an indicator variable that equals one if the fraction of shares retained from option exercise 
during a year exceeds 1%, and zero otherwise.  
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possibility is that female directors change boardroom dynamics, e.g. via improving the quality 
and/or intensity of discussions around complex decision problems. Heterogeneity of 
preferences and viewpoints between female and male directors would then result in moderated 
and less skewed beliefs about the firm’s prospects. Hence, the addition of even a single female 
director to an all-male board (and thus breaking the “old boys” atmosphere) is likely to be 
impactful. Drawn from the literature on minority influence, merely being exposed to a differing, 
minority viewpoint influences the holders of the majority viewpoint by making them more 
likely to engage in divergent thinking, leading to more thorough and comprehensive decision-
making processes (Peterson and Nemeth, 1996). 
However, to test the validity of this argument one would require access to board meetings, 
or to the very least access to detailed minutes of board meetings, which are not accessible to 
us. Using detailed minutes of board and board-committee meetings for 11 Israeli companies 
with a significant equity stake by the government, Schwartz-Ziv (2017) finds some evidence 
that female directors are more active at board-committee meetings than male directors. This 
finding is consistent with our conjecture, but only to the extent that the boardroom dynamics 
of Israeli government-controlled companies are similar to those of American firms. Future 
research that specifies the working of boardroom dynamics should shed more light on both the 
role of women in the boardroom, and corporate policy implications of mitigating managerial 
overconfidence. 
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Table 1 
Sample details by year and industry 
 
This table reports the distribution of female directors and the average option-based overconfidence measure, CEO 
option moneyness, across years and industries. Panel A shows the number and proportion of firms with at least 
one female director, and those with more than one female director, in addition to the average CEO option 
moneyness in each year. Panel B reports the same information as Panel A, but across the Fama-French 12 
industries (financial firms are excluded). 
Panel A. By year 
Year 
No. of  
obs. 
No. of firm-year  
obs. with female 
directors % 
No. of firm-year  
obs. with more than one 
female directors % 
Average  
CEO option  
moneyness 
1998 454 315 69.4% 108 23.8% 0.945 
1999 620 412 66.5% 157 25.3% 1.035 
2000 624 415 66.5% 160 25.6% 0.941 
2001 673 444 66.0% 163 24.2% 0.647 
2002 678 482 71.1% 217 32.0% 0.431 
2003 756 514 68.0% 208 27.5% 0.662 
2004 712 506 71.1% 219 30.8% 0.721 
2005 734 532 72.5% 221 30.1% 0.801 
2006 691 508 73.5% 227 32.9% 0.770 
2007 742 568 76.5% 318 42.9% 0.744 
2008 703 517 73.5% 257 36.6% 0.332 
2009 840 614 73.1% 302 36.0% 0.392 
2010 832 620 74.5% 299 35.9% 0.543 
2011 810 605 74.7% 319 39.4% 0.564 
2012 808 608 75.2% 318 39.4% 0.653 
2013 760 592 77.9% 331 43.6% 0.823 
Total 11,437 8252 72.2% 3824 33.4% 0.688 
 
Panel B. By Fama-French 12 industries 
Industry 
No. of  
obs. 
No. of firm- 
year obs. with 
female directors % 
No. of firm-year  
obs. with more than 
one female directors % 
Average  
CEO option  
moneyness 
Non-Durables 802 670 83.5% 460 57.4% 0.593 
Durables 340 241 70.9% 82 24.1% 0.633 
Manufacturing 1855 1289 69.5% 462 24.9% 0.593 
Energy 629 381 60.6% 127 20.2% 0.742 
Chemicals 511 426 83.4% 239 46.8% 0.594 
Business Eq. 2323 1306 56.2% 477 20.5% 0.741 
Telecom 183 141 77.0% 84 45.9% 0.536 
Utilities 748 691 92.4% 424 56.7% 0.401 
Shops 1536 1271 82.7% 689 44.9% 0.759 
Healthcare 1092 808 74.0% 350 32.1% 0.824 
Other   1418 1028 72.5% 430 30.3% 0.723 
Total 11,437 8252 72.2% 3824 33.4% 0.649 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports the means and medians of the variables used in this study for the entire male CEO sample and for the subsamples of firms with and without female directors. For 
each variable, the difference between the two subsamples are reported. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. t-tests (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney tests) are conducted to 
test for differences in the means (medians). ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Whole sample  
Firm-year obs. 
with female 
directors 
 
Firm-year obs. 
without female 
directors 
 Difference 
 
 N=11,113  N=7569  N=3544   
Variables Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
Main variables              
CEO option moneyness 0.686 0.337  0.620 0.314  0.828 0.392  -0.208*** -0.078*** 
Fraction of female directors 0.104 0.100 
 
0.153 0.125 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.153*** 0.125*** 
              
Firm characteristics              
Sales (million $) 5619.7 1623.8  7524.9 2499.6  1548.8 699.3  5976.1*** 1800.3*** 
Leverage 0.225 0.223  0.242 0.241  0.189 0.172  0.053*** 0.069*** 
Stock return 0.130 0.089  0.123 0.093  0.145 0.080  -0.021** 0.012 
ROA 0.143 0.136  0.147 0.139  0.132 0.131  0.015*** 0.008*** 
Tobin's q 1.930 1.542 
 
1.896 1.518 
 
2.004 1.597 
 
-0.108*** -0.079*** 
              
Governance and board characteristics              
Board independence 0.726 0.750  0.749 0.778  0.675 0.714  0.075*** 0.063*** 
Board size 9.368 9.000  10.122 10.000  7.757 8.000  2.365*** 2.000*** 
E index 2.571 3.000 
 
2.674 3.000 
 
2.350 2.000 
 
0.324*** 1.000*** 
              
CEO characteristics              
CEO age 55.612 56.000  55.806 56.000  55.197 55.000  0.609*** 1.000*** 
CEO Chairman 0.613 1.000  0.655 1.000  0.524 1.000  0.131*** 0.000*** 
CEO tenure 8.213 6.000  7.443 6.000  9.857 7.000  -2.414*** -1.000*** 
CEO ownership 0.015 0.003  0.011 0.002  0.023 0.004  -0.013*** -0.002*** 
MBA 0.379 0.000  0.401 0.000  0.333 0.000  0.068*** 0.000*** 
Age first CEO role 46.486 47.000  47.309 48.000  44.725 45.000  2.585*** 3.000*** 
Qualification 0.084 0.000  0.085 0.000  0.082 0.000  0.003 0.000 
Military experience 0.066 0.000  0.073 0.000  0.051 0.000  0.023*** 0.000*** 
Ivy League  0.193 0.000   0.202 0.000   0.174 0.000   0.028*** 0.000*** 
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Table 3 
Female board representation and CEO option moneyness 
 
This table examines how female board representation affects the CEO’s option holding and exercise behavior. 
Panel A presents OLS regression results for the male and female CEO samples. The dependent variable is the 
CEO’s stock option moneyness (CEO option moneyness). Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Panel B presents regression results based on alternative modelling techniques for the male CEO sample. 
Regressions (1) to (3) use CEO option moneyness as the dependent variable, while regressions (4) and (5) use 
Confident CEO as the dependent variable, where Confident CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
CEO’s option moneyness is greater than 100% (or 67%), and zero otherwise. The regressions in Panel B include 
the same firm, governance, and CEO characteristics as regression (3) of Panel A. However, only the regression 
coefficient on the main variable of interest, Fraction of female directors, is reported for brevity. Industry effects 
are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the 
heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for the Fama-
MacBeth regressions are computed using the Newey-West standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. OLS regression results for the male and female CEO samples 
 Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 Male CEO sample  Female CEO sample 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Fraction of female directors -0.943*** -0.836*** -0.624***  0.229 
 (0.174) (0.170) (0.167)  (0.377) 
Ln(Sales) − -0.013 0.020  -0.065 
  (0.011) (0.014)  (0.042) 
Leverage − -0.006 0.026  0.333 
  (0.097) (0.097)  (0.283) 
Stock return − 0.526*** 0.525***  0.234* 
  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.122) 
ROA − 0.878*** 0.860***  0.509 
  (0.244) (0.245)  (0.785) 
Tobin's q − 0.214*** 0.210***  0.209** 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.095) 
Board independence − − -0.126  0.701 
   (0.117)  (0.591) 
Board size − − -0.030***  -0.066* 
   (0.007)  (0.035) 
E index − − -0.008  -0.039 
   (0.013)  (0.032) 
CEO age − − 0.002  0.013 
   (0.003)  (0.011) 
CEO Chairman − − -0.017  -0.297** 
   (0.030)  (0.123) 
CEO tenure − − 0.005*  -0.002 
   (0.003)  (0.008) 
CEO ownership − − 0.534  1.165 
   (0.397)  (1.156) 
MBA − − 0.058*  -0.280** 
   (0.030)  (0.128) 
Age first CEO role − − -0.004  0.002 
   (0.003)  (0.010) 
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Qualification − − 0.009  0.438** 
   (0.057)  (0.175) 
Military experience − − 0.022  0.078 
   (0.057)  (0.204) 
Ivy League − − 0.030  0.018 
   (0.038)  (0.150) 
      
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  11,113 11,113 11,113  322 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.216 0.224   0.433 
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Panel B. Alternative modelling techniques using the male CEO sample 
 Dependent variables 
 
CEO option moneyness  
Overconfident CEO 
(moneyness>100%) 
Overconfident CEO 
(moneyness>67%) 
 Firm FE Fama and MacBeth CEO-Firm FE CEO-Firm FE (>1 change)  Logit Logit 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Fraction of female directors -0.615*** -0.566*** -0.053 -0.351**  -1.854*** -1.691*** 
 (0.235) (0.102) (0.236) (0.161)  (0.544) (0.460) 
        
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CEO-firm effects No No Yes Yes  No No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No No No  No No 
Industry effects No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes No Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 4,123  11,113 11,113 
Adjusted R2/Average R2 0.197 0.315 0.171 0.194  − − 
Pseudo R2 − − − −  0.174 0.154 
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Table 4 
Propensity score matching estimates 
 
This table reports the propensity score matching estimation results for the male CEO sample. Panel A reports 
parameter estimates from the logit model used to estimate propensity scores. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable for the presence of female directors in a firm for a given year. All independent variables are 
defined in the appendix. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. 
Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in 
parentheses. Panel B reports the univariate comparisons of firm characteristics between firms with and without 
female directors and the corresponding t-statistics. Panel C reports the average treatment effect estimates. CEO 
option moneyness is the CEO’s estimated stock option moneyness. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A. Prematch propensity score regression and postmatch diagnostic regression  
  Dependent variable: 
  Dummy equals 1 if female directors are on the board and 0 otherwise 
  Prematch  Postmatch 
  (1)  (2) 
Ln(Sales)  0.408***  -0.028 
  (0.049)  (0.052) 
Leverage  0.243  0.172 
  (0.315)  (0.332) 
Stock return  -0.115*  0.055 
  (0.062)  (0.073) 
ROA  0.528  0.120 
  (0.591)  (0.641) 
Tobin's q  0.073  -0.001 
  (0.048)  (0.056) 
Board independence  2.209***  -0.216 
  (0.332)  (0.360) 
Board size  0.404***  -0.004 
  (0.032)  (0.032) 
E index  0.100**  -0.005 
  (0.044)  (0.047) 
CEO age  0.003  -0.003 
  (0.011)  (0.011) 
CEO Chairman  0.399***  -0.016 
  (0.102)  (0.110) 
CEO tenure  -0.037***  0.005 
  (0.011)  (0.011) 
CEO ownership  -1.511  -0.326 
  (1.136)  (1.224) 
MBA  0.166  -0.001 
  (0.107)  (0.118) 
Age first CEO role  -0.007  -0.002 
  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Qualification  -0.218  -0.023 
  (0.186)  (0.196) 
Military experience  0.130  0.003 
  (0.214)  (0.255) 
Ivy League  0.048  -0.023 
  (0.136)  (0.150) 
     
Industry effects  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations   11,091  4,500 
Pseudo R2  0.294  0.003 
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Panel B. Differences in firm characteristics 
 
Variables 
 
 
 Firm-year obs. 
with female dirs. 
(N=2,250) 
 Firm-year obs. 
without female dirs. 
(N=2,250) 
 Difference 
 
 
 t-statistics 
 
 
Ln(Sales)  6.928  6.970  -0.042  -1.153 
Leverage  0.211  0.210  0.001  0.168 
Stock return  0.141  0.130  0.011  0.772 
ROA  0.135  0.136  -0.001  -0.140 
Tobin's q  1.927  1.909  0.018  0.514 
Board independence  0.705  0.707  -0.002  -0.298 
Board size  8.480  8.508  -0.028  -0.535 
E index  2.527  2.543  -0.016  -0.429 
CEO age  55.028  55.138  -0.110  -0.524 
CEO Chairman  0.543  0.547  -0.004  -0.269 
CEO tenure  8.750  8.553  0.197  0.933 
CEO ownership  0.015  0.016  -0.001  -0.055 
MBA  0.352  0.352  0.000  0.031 
Age first CEO role  45.442  45.707  -0.265  -1.171 
Qualification  0.088  0.090  -0.001  -0.157 
Military experience  0.055  0.056  -0.001  -0.131 
Ivy League  0.181  0.182  -0.001  -0.077 
 
Panel C. Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
 
Variables 
 
 
 Firm-year obs. 
with female dirs. 
(N=2,250) 
 Firm-year obs. 
without female dirs. 
(N=2,250) 
 Difference 
 
 
 t-statistics 
 
 
CEO option moneyness  0.696  0.776  -0.081***  -2.510 
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Table 5 
Instrumental variables estimates 
 
This table presents estimates of the instrumental variables method using two-stage least square (2SLS) panel regressions. The dependent variable is the fraction of female 
directors and CEO option moneyness for the first and second stage regressions, respectively. The instrumental variables are as follows. Fraction of male directors linked to 
female directors is the fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards with at least one female director. Female-to-male population ratio is calculated as the 
female population divided by the male population in the state where the firm has its headquarters. All other variables are defined in the appendix. Industry and year effects 
are included. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-
clustered standard errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variables 
 
Fraction female 
directors 
CEO option 
moneyness 
 
Fraction female 
directors 
CEO option 
moneyness 
 
Fraction female 
directors 
CEO option 
moneyness 
 First stage Second stage  First stage Second stage  First stage Second stage  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fraction male linked to female, z1 0.029*** −  0.038*** −  0.084*** − 
 (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.009)  
Female-to-male population ratio, z2 0.211*** −  0.212*** −  0.203*** − 
 (0.074)   (0.074)   (0.072)  
Fraction of female directors − -6.672***  − -4.991***  − -3.814*** 
  (2.365)   (1.931)   (1.003) 
Ln(Sales) 0.012*** 0.106***  0.012*** 0.095***  0.014*** 0.085*** 
 (0.002) (0.037)  (0.002) (0.031)  (0.002) (0.023) 
Leverage 0.014 0.112  0.014 0.100  0.018* 0.094 
 (0.011) (0.114)  (0.011) (0.105)  (0.010) (0.100) 
Stock return -0.004** 0.502***  -0.004** 0.505***  -0.005*** 0.508*** 
 (0.002) (0.036)  (0.002) (0.035)  (0.002) (0.033) 
ROA -0.015 0.712***  -0.017 0.697***  -0.030 0.684*** 
 (0.020) (0.269)  (0.020) (0.257)  (0.019) (0.251) 
Tobin's q 0.002 0.221***  0.002 0.221***  0.003** 0.220*** 
 (0.002) (0.024)  (0.002) (0.023)  (0.001) (0.023) 
Board independence 0.077*** 0.393  0.079*** 0.311  0.089*** 0.249 
 (0.011) (0.245)  (0.011) (0.209)  (0.011) (0.155) 
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Board size 0.004*** -0.002  0.005*** -0.003  0.007*** -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.014)  (0.001) (0.013)  (0.001) (0.010) 
E index 0.002* 0.008  0.002* 0.004  0.002* 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.015)  (0.001) (0.014)  (0.001) (0.013) 
CEO age 0.000 0.004  0.000 0.004  0.000 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.004) 
CEO Chairman 0.013*** 0.068  0.013*** 0.049  0.013*** 0.034 
 (0.003) (0.048)  (0.003) (0.043)  (0.003) (0.035) 
CEO tenure -0.001*** -0.004  -0.002*** -0.002  -0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.004) 
CEO ownership -0.015 0.231  -0.014 0.254  -0.013 0.264 
 (0.038) (0.410)  (0.038) (0.382)  (0.037) (0.370) 
MBA 0.006* 0.091**  0.006* 0.083**  0.006* 0.076** 
 (0.003) (0.038)  (0.003) (0.035)  (0.003) (0.033) 
Age first CEO role -0.000 -0.006  -0.000 -0.005  -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.003) 
Qualification -0.005 -0.013  -0.005 -0.007  -0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.070)  (0.006) (0.065)  (0.006) (0.061) 
Military experience 0.017** 0.131  0.017** 0.101  0.016** 0.078 
 (0.007) (0.085)  (0.007) (0.076)  (0.007) (0.065) 
Ivy League 0.001 0.053  0.001 0.051  0.001 0.049 
 (0.004) (0.045)  (0.004) (0.041)  (0.004) (0.040) 
No. external board seats − −  -0.001** -0.008***  − − 
    (0.000) (0.003)    
No. male external board seats − −  − −  -0.004*** -0.015*** 
       (0.000) (0.004) 
         
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 10,844 10,844  10,844 10,844  10,844 10,844 
F-statistic (z1=z2=0) 9.120*** −  11.380*** −  45.010*** − 
CD Wald F-statistic 45.610 −  51.630 −  165.740 − 
Hansen’s J test p-value  − 0.170   − 0.260    − 0.647 
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Table 6 
Changes in CEO option moneyness around director appointments 
 
This table reports the results of the difference-in-differences analysis for the male CEO sample. The dependent variable is the CEO’s stock option moneyness. Female 
appointment is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm appoint a female director, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that equals one in the period after the 
appointment, and zero otherwise. Post -2, Post -1, Post +1, and Post +2 are indicator variables for the second year prior to, the first year prior to, the first year after, and the second 
year after the appointment, respectively. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 
3. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard 
errors reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 OLS OLS Pair FE OLS Pair FE  
[-1, +1] 
(1) 
[-1, +1] 
(2) 
[-1, +1] 
(3) 
[-2, +2] 
(4) 
[-2, +2] 
(5) 
Female appointment -0.074 -0.049 − − − 
 (0.158) (0.195)    
Post 0.207* 0.219* 0.029 0.273** 0.387** 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.458) (0.114) (0.170) 
Female appointment × Post -0.282** -0.301** -0.251** − − 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.097)   
Female appointment × Post -2 − − − 0.162 − 
    (0.152)  
Female appointment × Post -1 − − − 0.031 -0.047 
    (0.128) (0.101) 
Female appointment × Post +1 − − − -0.265** -0.331** 
    (0.119) (0.137) 
Female appointment × Post +2 − − − -0.308** -0.343* 
    (0.150) (0.174) 
Dummy_MBA replaces non-MBA − -0.044 − − − 
  (0.177)    
Dummy_Non-MBA replaces MBA − 0.205 − − − 
  (0.283)    
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Dummy_Ivy replaces non-Ivy − 0.282 − − − 
  (0.282)    
Dummy_Non-Ivy replaces Ivy − -0.049 − − − 
  (0.227)    
Dummy_Qualif. replaces non-Qualif. − -0.008 − − − 
  (0.167)    
Dummy_Non-Qualif. replaces Qualif. − -0.114 − − − 
  (0.311)    
      
All controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Director-pair effects No No Yes No Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes No Yes No 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 224 224 224 360 360 
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.381 0.518 0.360 0.368 
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Table 7 
Female board representation, overconfidence, and corporate investment 
 
This table contains regression models that examine the relation between female board representation, overconfidence, investment, and investment cash flows sensitivity. The 
dependent variable, Capital expenditures, is defined as the firm’s capital expenditures in year t+1 scaled by net property, plant and equipment in year t. Variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix. The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-
industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Capital expenditures (CAPEX t+1/PPE t) 
 Whole sample  High industry OC representation Low industry OC representation 
 OLS Firm FE 
 OLS Firm FE OLS Firm FE 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged capital expenditures 0.239*** 0.003  0.164*** -0.252* 0.385*** 0.063 
 (0.058) (0.072)  (0.055) (0.135) (0.057) (0.064) 
Fraction of female directors 0.044 0.039  0.191 0.440* 0.055 0.080 
 (0.035) (0.047)  (0.123) (0.241) (0.048) (0.069) 
High industry OC representation 0.046*** 0.039***  − − − − 
 (0.012) (0.013)      
Fraction of female directors  -0.131** -0.114*  − − − − 
          × High industry OC representation (0.065) (0.068)      
Cash flow − −  0.376** 0.916** 0.076 0.307*** 
    (0.172) (0.385) (0.053) (0.090) 
Fraction of female directors × Cash flow − −  -1.989* -2.936* -0.382 -0.874 
     (1.144) (1.778) (0.362) (0.552) 
        
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
Year effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,802 8,802  4,133 4,133 4,669 4,669 
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.033  0.167 0.142 0.354 0.086 
 
53 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Female board representation, overconfidence and merger activities 
 
This table contains regression models that examine the relation between female board representation, 
overconfidence and merger activities. The dependent variable is the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns from 
five days before the acquisition announcement to five days after. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry effects are constructed 
based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity 
robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CAR [-5,+5] 
 OLS 
(1) 
 Heckman 2
nd step 
(2) 
Fraction of female directors -0.010  -0.015 
 (0.055)  (0.055) 
High industry OC representation -0.017  -0.017 
 (0.012)  (0.012) 
Fraction of female directors  0.155**  0.153** 
          × High industry OC representation (0.075)  (0.076) 
Diversifying deal  -0.008  -0.008 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
All equity -0.024**  -0.024** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Deal size -0.010***  -0.010*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Inverse Mills ratio −  0.034 
   (0.050) 
        
All controls  Yes  Yes 
Industry effects Yes  Yes 
Year effects Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 742  742 
Adjusted R2 0.082  0.081 
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Table 9 
Female board representation, overconfidence and corporate performance 
 
This table contains regression models that examine the relation between female board representation, overconfidence and corporate performance/value. The dependent variables 
include Tobin’s q, ROE (return on equity), and ROA (return on assets). The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry effects are 
constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variables 
 Tobin’s q ROE ROA 
 OLS Firm FE OLS Firm FE OLS Firm FE 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged ROE 0.795*** 0.504*** 0.561*** 0.292*** 0.800*** 0.486*** 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.040) (0.054) (0.011) (0.024) 
Fraction of female directors -0.068 -0.171 -0.021 0.104 0.001 0.024**  
(0.083) (0.139) (0.047) (0.086) (0.008) (0.012) 
High industry OC representation -0.062*** 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.006***  
(0.020) (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fraction of female directors 0.412*** 0.424*** 0.189*** 0.177** 0.017* 0.002 
           × High industry OC representation (0.128) (0.144) (0.062) (0.075) (0.010) (0.012) 
        
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,851 8,851 8,851 8,851 8,851 8,851 
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.415 0.410 0.100 0.681 0.272 
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Table 10 
Female board representation and corporate performance during the recent financial crisis 
This table presents the OLS regressions results of the change in firm performance (denoted as ΔTobin's q, ΔROA, and ΔROE) and CEO option moneyness (denoted as ΔCEO 
option moneyness) from 2007 to 2009 on the severity of the house price collapse across firms with varying degrees of female board representation. The other control variables 
are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. All independent variables are measured in 2006. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry 
classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variables 
 ΔCEO option moneyness  ΔTobin's q ΔROA ΔROE  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of female directors 0.400  -0.259 -0.043 -0.125 
 (0.282)  (0.320) (0.040) (0.104) 
4th Qtile House price shock -0.096*  -0.084* -0.016** -0.050*** 
 (0.055)  (0.047) (0.007) (0.018) 
Fraction of female directors × 4th Qtile House price shock 0.667**  -0.188 0.142*** 0.329** 
 (0.323)  (0.328) (0.045) (0.127) 
1st Qtile House price shock -0.138  0.025 -0.008 -0.035* 
 (0.089)  (0.050) (0.008) (0.020) 
Fraction of female directors × 1st Qtile House price shock 0.320  -0.653 0.036 0.098 
 (0.651)  (0.432) (0.059) (0.148)       
All controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of bservations 516  516 516 516 
Adjusted R2 0.220   0.099 0.153 0.078 
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Appendix 
Variable definition 
 
Variables Description Source    
Main variables   
CEO option moneyness We estimate the average CEO stock option moneyness for each year following Campbell et al. 
(2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012). Specifically, we first calculate the average realizable value 
per option by dividing the total realizable value of the exercisable options by the number of 
exercisable options. Next, we subtract the average realizable value from the fiscal year-end 
stock price to obtain the average exercise price of the options. The estimated moneyness of the 
options is then calculated as the stock price divided by the estimated average exercise price 
minus one. 
ExecuComp 
Fraction of female directors The ratio of the number of female directors on the board to board size. IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Fraction of male directors linked to 
female directors 
The fraction of male directors on the board who sit on other boards with at least one female 
director.  
IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Female-to-male population ratio The ratio of the female population to the male population in the state where the firm is 
headquartered for a given year.  
US Economic 
Census 
Female appointment An indicator variable that equals one if the firm appoint a female director, and zero otherwise. IRRC/RiskMetrics 
   
   
Firm characteristics 
  
Ln(Sales) The natural logarithm of the firm's sales. Compustat 
Leverage The sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets. Compustat 
Stock return  The firm’s stock return over the past year CSRP 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total assets.  Compustat 
ROE Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by common equity.  Compustat 
Tobin's q The market value of equity plus book value of total assets minus book value of equity, all 
divided by total assets, where the market value of equity is the year-end closing price times the 
number of stocks outstanding. 
Compustat 
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Variables Description Source 
Board variables and other controls 
  
Board independence  The fraction of independent directors on the board.  IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Board size  The number of directors on the board. IRRC/RiskMetrics 
E index  The Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index based on six antitakeover provisions: staggered 
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments. The index measures the 
number of antitakeover provisions in place. 
RiskMetrics, 
 
No. external board seats The total number of external board seats by directors. IRRC/RiskMetrics 
No. male external board seats The total number of external board seats by male directors. IRRC/RiskMetrics 
   
   
CEO characteristics 
  
CEO age The age of the CEO in years. ExecuComp 
CEO Chairman  An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. ExecuComp 
CEO tenure  The number of years the CEO has been in office.  ExecuComp 
CEO ownership  The fraction of the firm’s stocks owned by the CEO.  ExecuComp 
MBA An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has an MBA degree, and zero otherwise.  BoardEx 
Age first CEO role  The age at which the CEO became CEO for the first time.  BoardEx 
Qualification  An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO holds professional qualifications, and zero 
otherwise.  
BoardEx 
Military experience  An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO has prior military service, and zero otherwise. BoardEx 
Ivy League An indicator variable that equals one if the CEO attended an Ivy League university (i.e., Brown 
University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, 
Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University) at any academic level, 
and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
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Variables Description Source 
Other variables 
  
Dummy_MBA replaces non-MBA An indicator variable that equals one if an incumbent director without an MBA degree is 
replaced by a new director with an MBA degree, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Dummy_Non-MBA replaces MBA An indicator variable that equals one if an incumbent director with an MBA degree is replaced 
by a new director without an MBA degree, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Dummy_Ivy replaces non-Ivy An indicator variable that equals one if an incumbent director who did not attend an Ivy League 
university is replaced by a new director who did, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Dummy_Non-Ivy replaces Ivy An indicator variable that equals one if an incumbent director who attended an Ivy League 
university is replaced by a new director who did not, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Dummy_Qualif. replaces non-Qualif. An indicator variable that equals one if an incumbent director without professional 
qualification is replaced by a new director with professional qualification, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Dummy_Non-Qualif. replaces Qualif. An indicator variable that equals one if an incumbent director with professional qualification 
is replaced by a new director without professional qualification, and zero otherwise. 
BoardEx 
Female appointment A dummy variable that equals one if the firm appoints a female director, and zero otherwise.  IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Post A dummy variable that equals one in the period after the appointment of a female director, and 
zero otherwise.  
IRRC/RiskMetrics 
Value ratio  The ratio of the intrinsic value to the strike price of the option, where the intrinsic value is 
calculated as the stock price at exercise minus the strike price. 
Thomson Reuters 
Insider Filings 
database 
Time to expiration The remaining number of years until option expiration at exercise. Thomson Reuters 
Insider Filings 
database 
High industry OC representation  A dummy variable that equals one if the fraction of overconfident CEOs for an industry in that 
year is greater than the sample median across all industries and zero otherwise, where 
overconfident CEOs are those who hold stock options that are more than 67% in the money.  
ExecuComp 
Cash flow The sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation, scaled by net plant, property 
and equipment. 
Compustat 
 
59 
 
Variables Description Source 
Capital expenditures The firm’s capital expenditures in year t+1 scaled by net property, plant and equipment in year 
t.  
Compustat 
Prior industry merger intensity The total number of merger deals in the industry within the past two years divided by the total 
number of mergers across all industries over the same period. Industries are defined based on 
the Fama-French 49-industry classification. 
SDC 
Diversifying deal  A dummy variable that equals one if the bidder and target are in different two-digit SIC 
industries, and zero otherwise.  
SDC 
All equity  A dummy variable that equals one if the method of payment was 100% equity, and zero 
otherwise.  
SDC 
Deal size  The natural logarithm of one plus the reported deal value. SDC 
CAR [-5,+5] The acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns from five days before the acquisition 
announcement to five days after, where the abnormal returns are the market model residuals, 
with the parameters estimated over the [-205, -6] window relative to the announcement day.  
CRSP 
4th Qtile House price shock  An indicator variable for the fourth quartile (most severe) of House price shock, where House 
price shock is the percentage drop in the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) from December 
2006 until December 2009 in the company’s state of headquarters. 
Zillow 
1th Qtile House price shock An indicator variable for the first quartile (least severe) of House price shock, where House 
price shock is the percentage drop in the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) from December 
2006 until December 2009 in the company’s state of headquarters. 
Zillow 
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Section 4.2.1. Alternative matching criteria 
 
This table examines the robustness of our results to the use of alternative matching criteria. CEO option moneyness 
is the CEO’s estimated stock option moneyness. Fraction of female directors is the ratio of the number of female 
directors on the board to board size. Panels A to C present the average treatment effect estimates using alternative 
matching criteria. Panel D re-estimates the effect of female board representation on CEO option moneyness using 
matched samples. The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry 
effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on 
the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Variables 
 
 Firm-year obs. 
with female  
dirs. 
 Firm-year obs. 
without female  
dirs. 
 
Difference 
 
 
t-statistics 
 
Panel A. Within industry-year matching       
CEO option moneyness  0.638  0.770  -0.132***  -4.010 
 
Panel B. Within Industry-year-MBA matching 
    
CEO option moneyness  0.629  0.762  -0.133***  -3.940 
 
Panel C. Within industry-year-Ivy matching 
    
CEO option moneyness  0.657  0.777  -0.120***  -3.500 
 
Panel D. Female board representation and CEO option moneyness using matched samples 
 
Baseline 
matching 
Within industry-
year matching 
Within industry-year-
MBA matching 
Within industry-
year-Ivy matching 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of 
female directors -0.592** -0.615** -0.691*** -0.716*** 
 (0.249) (0.239) (0.233) (0.238)      
     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,500 4,034 3,756 3,864 
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.245 0.263 0.247 
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Section 4.3. Female board representation and CEO option exercise behavior 
 
This table contains the regressions that examine the relation between female board representation and the 
characteristics of the exercised options. The dependent variable in regressions (1) and (2) is Value ratio, which is 
defined as the ratio of the intrinsic value to the strike price of the option, where the intrinsic value is calculated as 
the stock price at exercise minus the strike price. The dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is Time to 
expiration, which is defined as the remaining number of years until option expiration at exercise. Both Value ratio 
and Time to expiration are aggregated for each CEO on an annual basis, using a simple average over the number 
of options exercised. CEO-years without option exercises are omitted from the analysis. Fraction of female 
directors is the number of female directors divided by board size. The control variables are the same as for 
regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. For the sake of brevity, we report only the coefficients on the main variable 
of interest. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical 
significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variables 
 
Value ratio  Time to expiration 
  
OLS 
(1) 
Firm FE 
(2) 
 OLS 
(3) 
Firm FE 
(4) 
Fraction of female directors -1.584** -1.753**  0.560* 0.445* 
 (0.783) (0.868)  (0.306) (0.258) 
      
All controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes No  Yes No 
Year effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,380 8,380  8,427 8,427 
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.148   0.087 0.067 
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Section 7. Alternative constructs of the female director variable 
 
This table examines the relationship between female board representation and CEO option moneyness using 
alternative constructs of the female director variable. The dependent variable is the CEO’s stock option moneyness 
(CEO option moneyness). Female directors is an indicator variable that equals one if there is at least one female 
director on the board, and zero otherwise. Multiple female directors is an indicator variable that equals one if there 
is more than one female director on the board, and zero otherwise. Female committee members is an indicator 
variable that equals one if there is at least one female director with committee membership(s), and zero otherwise. 
Female CFO is an indicator variable that equals one if the CFO is a female, and zero otherwise. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel 
A in Table 3. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical 
significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 (1) (2) 
Female directors -0.091*** 0.083* 
 (0.035) (0.045) 
Multiple female directors -0.080** − 
 (0.032)  
Female committee members − -0.139** 
  (0.061) 
Female CFO − -0.145* 
  (0.082) 
   
All controls Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,113 10,779 
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.227 
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Section 7. Managerial overconfidence and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
This table contains regression models that examine the relation between managerial overconfidence and 
investment cash flows sensitivity. The dependent variable, Capital expenditures, is defined as the firm’s capital 
expenditures in year t+1 scaled by net property, plant and equipment in year t. Variable definitions are provided 
in the Appendix. The other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry 
effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on 
the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Capital expenditures (CAPEX t+1/PPE t) 
  
OLS 
(1) 
Firm FE 
(2) 
Lagged capital expenditures 0.499*** 0.193*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) 
Cash flow 0.074*** 0.236*** 
 (0.024) (0.034) 
CEO option moneyness 0.019*** 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Cash flow × CEO option moneyness 0.036* 0.025* 
 (0.021) (0.014) 
   
All controls Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes No 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 8,804 8,804 
Adjusted R2 0.491 0.194 
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Section 7. Female board representation and CEO option moneyness  
with additional controls 
 
This table examines the relationship between female board representation and CEO option moneyness with 
additional controls. The dependent variable is the CEO’s stock option moneyness (CEO option moneyness). 
Fraction of female directors is the ratio of the number of female directors on the board to board size. Volatility is 
the annualized standard deviation of monthly stock return over the past year. Ln(1 + Delta) is the natural logarithm 
of one plus CEO delta, where delta is defined as the change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 1% increase 
in the firm’s stock price. Ln(1 + Vega) is the natural logarithm of one plus CEO vega, where vega is defined as 
the change in the value of the CEO’s wealth due to a 0.01 increase in the annualized standard deviation of the 
firm’s stock return. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The other control variables are the same 
as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry effects are constructed based on the Fama-French 49-industry 
classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors 
reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for the Fama-MacBeth regressions are computed using the Newey-
West standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 
OLS 
(1) 
Firm FE 
(2) 
Fraction of female directors -0.308* -0.536** 
 (0.162) (0.242) 
Volatility 0.171** 0.443*** 
 (0.075) (0.094) 
ln(1+Vega) -0.273*** -0.207*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
ln(1+Delta) 0.333*** 0.186*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) 
   
All controls Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 8,485 8,485 
Adjusted R-squared 0.295 0.238 
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Section 7. Robustness check: Are the results driven by a few  
very vocal female directors? 
 
This table examines whether the findings are driven by a few very vocal female directors. The dependent variable 
is the CEO’s stock option moneyness (CEO option moneyness). Fraction of female directors is the ratio of the 
number of female directors on the board to board size. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The 
other control variables are the same as for regression (3) of Panel A in Table 3. Industry effects are constructed 
based on the Fama-French 49-industry classification. Statistical significance is based on the heteroskedasticity 
robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for the Fama-MacBeth regressions 
are computed using the Newey-West standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 
Exclude firm-years where at least one female director  
has more than … 
 6 directorships 5 directorships 4 directorships 3 directorships 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of female directors -0.620*** -0.636*** -0.603*** -0.579*** 
 (0.170) (0.174) (0.183) (0.206) 
     
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 10,587 10,258 9,465 8,113 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.225 0.229 0.231 
 
 
 
 
Section 7. Alternative explanations and further robustness tests 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net buyer indicator  Share retainer indicator 
 OLS Firm FE Logit   OLS Firm FE Logit   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fraction of female directors -0.052 -0.105* -0.716**  -0.227* -0.107 -1.022* 
 (0.044) (0.063) (0.342)  (0.127) (0.167) (0.565) 
        
All controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,113 11,113 11,113  6,755 6,755 6,755 
Adjusted R2/ Pseudo R2 0.043 0.024 0.084  0.073 0.029 0.064 
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Section 7. Alternative explanations and further robustness tests 
 
Panel A. Excluding firm-years with CEO turnovers  
 
Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 OLS Firm fixed effects  
(1) (2) 
Fraction of female directors -0.643*** -0.676*** 
 (0.172) (0.249)    
   
All controls  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Number of observations 10,589 10,589 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.201 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Excluding recession periods 2001-2002 and 2007-2009  
 
Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 OLS Firm fixed effects  
(1) (2) 
Fraction of female directors -0.677*** -0.569** 
 (0.199) (0.282)    
   
All controls  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Number of observations 7,578 7,578 
Adjusted R2 0.233 0.201 
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Panel C. OLS regression results with alternative clustering 
 
Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 By year By industry By firm and year 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Fraction of female directors -0.627*** -0.627*** -0.627*** 
 (0.116) (0.161) (0.172)     
    
All controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.224 0.229 
 
 
 
Panel D. OLS regression results with alternative definitions of industry effects 
 
Dependent variable: CEO option moneyness 
 
SIC2  
industries 
NAICS3 
industries 
FF49 industries  
without year effects 
FF49×Year 
effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of female directors -0.619*** -0.650*** -0.658*** -0.648*** 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.168) (0.165) 
          
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Year effects Yes Yes No No 
Industry × Year effects No No No Yes 
Number of observations 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113 
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.228 0.198 0.269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
